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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss the use of federal habeas corpus by state
prisoners in light of the recent amendments to the Federal Habeas Corpus
Act.' Since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Allen2 the federal
courts have considered that the purpose of federal habeas corpus is to re-
determine the merits of constitutional issues previously decided by the
state courts in criminal convictions. This is usually accomplished by hold-
ing an evidentiary hearing and making new findings of fact if the federal
judge considers the state finding of fact to be inadequate. When a state
prisoner can be released by a single federal judge after the prisoner has
been convicted in the state courts and the conviction has been affirmed
through the entire state court appellate system, tension is created between
the federal and state judicial systems. In fact, many legal writers have
taken the alternative positions that the state courts should simply with-
draw from determining constitutional questions since the federal courts
will ultimately relitigate these issues,' or that federal habeas corpus should
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (Supp. II, 1965-66), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964); 28
U.S.C. § 2244(c) (Supp. II, 1965-66), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964); 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(Supp. II, 1965-66), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964) (the amended statutes are herein-
after cited without dates) ; See note, 45 TEx. L. REV. 592 (1967).
2. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). For the leading discussion of the impact of this case see
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441 (1953).
3. See Note, State Court Withdrawal From Habeas Corpus, 114 U. PA. REV. 1081, 1095
(1966):
Through state court withdrawal smacks of an ostrich-like philosophy, it would
mean that a state judge was not reversed-simply because he never ruled upon the
question. The result-federal court issuance of the writ-would be identical in
either case, but state judges would not feel the sting of reversal of their denials of
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be abolished.4 Recent Supreme Court decisions increasing the availability
of habeas corpus to state prisoners have increased the tensions between
the judicial systems,5 and the conflict was at a critical stage when the
Federal Habeas Corpus Act was amended. These amendments are an at-
tempt to ease the tension between the judicial systems by limiting the
abuse of federal habeas corpus by state prisoners and encouraging the
states to adopt adequate fact finding procedures."
These amendments should affect the practice of every member of the
bar. The attorneys who do not practice criminal law will still be called
upon to be appointed counsel for indigent prisoners. For the legal schol-
ars, although habeas corpus may be the oldest of the writs little is known
of its origin7 and the extent of the writ has yet to be determined.' As a
practical matter, a knowledge of the law regarding habeas corpus is essen-
tial in many types of civil litgation 9 and it is a powerful legal weapon
which should be stocked in the arsenal of every lawyer. 0
the writ, especially if the federal court had based its determination upon allegations
which had not been presented to the state court in the original state proceedings.
4. Desmond, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions-Proposals for Re-
form, 9 UTAH L. REv. 18, 44 (1964): "We are faced with an intolerable condition, and it
is no answer to it to say that some judges are more sensitive than others."
5. For a discussion of these decisions see: Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-
Habeas Sorpus-The 1963 Trilogy, 42 N.C. L. REV. 352 (1964); Note, Burden of Habeas
Corpus Petitions from State Prisoners, 52 VA. L. REV. 486 (1966); Wilson, Federal Habeas
Corpus and the State Court Criminal Defendant, 19 VAND. L. REV. 741 (1966) ; Note, State
Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 HARV. L. REV. 422 (1966). The scope
of these decisions is set forth in notes 53-67 and text, at p. 417, infra.
6. S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966); This legislation is the culmination
of a long history of efforts by both sides of the dispute. See Brennan, Some Aspects of
Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 945, 957 (1964):
Rather than as an unwarranted federal encroachment upon state domains, the
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction should be taken by the states as an opportunity
to fashion state remedies as good or better for the disposition of the federal claims
of state prisoners.
See also Carter, The Use of Federal Habeas Corpus by State Prisoners, 23 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 23, 35 (1966):
Is it not high time that more emphasis was placed on the prompt and effective ad-
ministration of criminal justice, rather than undue emphasis on constitutional pro-
cedural rights?
[Ilt is now the duty of the bar to become interested and active in bringing
about the correction of a procedural process that is materially contributing to that
frustration of justice by causing protracted and undue delay through an unnecessary
dual system of appeals, and to do so promptly. (Emphasis added.)
7. See Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus-A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179 (1948).
8. See Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction-The Undeveloped Areas, 41 WASH.
L. REV. 327 (1966). This article discusses the use of federal habeas corpus in selective serv-
ice classification and induction, alien deportation and exclusion, military commissions and
court martials and, the American Indian Courts. See also Kutner, "International" Due Pro-
cess for Prisoners of War: The-Need for a Special Tribunal of World Habeas Corpus, .21
U. MIAMI L. REV. 721 (1967).
9. Habeas Corpus may -be used for domestic relations, mental patients and quarantine
due to health regulations. See Note, Habeas Corpus and the Indigent Mental Patient in New
York, 35 FoRo. L. REV. 531 (1967) ; Note, Domestic Relations-Habeas Corpus Upheld as a
Collateral Attack Upon a Child Custody Order 36 U. DFT. L.J. 348 (1959). See generally
39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus §§ 41-50. (1944).110. Bailey, Federal Habeas Corpus-Old Writ, New Role: An Overhaul for State
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While it is not necessary to have a knowledge of every technical de-
tail in habeas corpus proceedings, a basic understanding of the history
and principles underlying the federal habeas corpus action is essential to
use it effectively.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Habeas corpus means literally "you have the body."'" The writ is
directed to the person having custody of the "body" of the prisoner and
commands the custodian to produce the "body" before the court so that
the court may inquire into the legality of the "body's" detention.' Habeas
corpus is a collateral proceeding and should be distinguished from direct
proceedings such as appeal and certiorari.' 3 It is a civil, not a criminal
proceeding, and the guilt or innocence of the prisoner is not in issue.'4 The
only issue before the court should be the legality of restraint.
Historically, the writ of habeas corpus is probably the most famous
writ in the law and is often called the "Great Writ of Liberty." It had its
origin in the common law of England, and the English colonists in Amer-
ica regarded it as one of their most valued rights.' 5 The United States
recognized it as inherited common law by article I section 9 of the Con-
stitution, and Congress included it in the powers of the courts in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, section 14.16 In Ex Parte Bollman,'7 the Supreme
Court recognized that the judicial power of the United States clearly
comprehends habeas corpus. The original Federal Habeas Corpus Act of
1801 has been amended several times and is now 28 U.S.C. sections 2241-
2255.18
Criminal Justice, 45 BOST. U. L. REV. 161, 162 (1965). In this article, F. Lee Bailey tells
of his use of habeas corpus to secure the release for Dr. Sam Sheppard. See also Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 837, (4th ed. 1951).
12. This is the essence of habeas corpus. Another definition of the writ is found in
Carter, supra Note 6, at 24:
"It is directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the
body of the applicant at a certain time and place, with the cause of his detention,
and submit to whatever order the court issuing the Writ shall direct."
13. See generally 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 13 (1944).
14. See generally 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 13 (1944).
15. See Carter, The Use of Federal Habeas Corpus by State Prisoners, 23 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 23, 24 (1966).
16. Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus-A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179, 180 (1948).
This article contains an interesting point in stating that the writ of habeas corpus was first
used to put people into prison and later became a method for getting people out of prison:
The early writers tell us meagerly of the appropriate procedures and somewhat
less than generously of the changes which occurred in the method, objects, and reach
of the various writs. Mr. Jenks says: "This perhaps is the most embarrassing dis-
covery, the more -one studies the ancient writs of habeas corpus (for there were
many varieties of the article) the more clear grows the conviction that, whatever
may have been its ultimate use, the writ of habeas corpus was originally intended
not to get people out of prison, but to put them in it."
17. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 74 (1807).
18. See Longsdorf, The Federal Habeas. Corpus Acts Original and Amended, 13 F.R.D.
407 (1953).
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III. UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
The key words to understanding federal habeas corpus are custody,
constitutional rights, exhaustion of state remedies and evidentiary hear-
ing. The prisoner must be held in custody in violation of his constitutional
rights19 and show an exhaustion of state remedies20 by proving that he has
presented his claims throughout the state court system in order to qualify
for a hearing on his petition."' If the only issue before the court is a ques-
tion of law and the state court findings of fact were adequate, the court
may grant or deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing. If, how-
ever, it finds that the state courts did not make an adequate finding of
fact, the federal court may hold an evidentiary hearing and make new
findings of fact.
22
A. The Custody Requirement
"Custody" should be thought of in terms of seeking immediate re-
lease from present custody.3 Four situations should be distinguished
when speaking of the custody requirement in federal habeas corpus. First,
when a prisoner is unconditionally released from prison his petition is
said to be moot. 4 Second, when a prisoner is released from one custody
to another his petition against his former custodian is also said to be
moot. 5 Third, when a prisoner is serving concurrent sentences his petition
attacking only one sentence will be dismissed since the granting of the
petition will not result in his immediate release;26 the same reasoning
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3):
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States...
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a):
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b):
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,
or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the exist-
ence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c):
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right
under the law of the state to raise, by any available procedure, the question pre-
sented.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) set forth in note 88, infra.
23. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
24. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960) ; Morrison v. Heritage, 324 F.2d 698 (5th Cir.
1963).
25. Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959) ; Wainwright v. Phillips, 360 F.2d 617
(5th Cir. 1966).
26. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934); See Note, Habeas Corpus and the Prematurity
Rule, 66 CoLum. L. REV. 1164 (1966) ; Note, The Uncertain Rules of Timeliness in Petitions
for the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 11 ViL. L. REV. 589 (1966).
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applies when a prisoner is serving consecutive sentences and only attacks
the sentence he is serving. Fourth, when the prisoner is serving consecu-
tive sentences and attacks the one to be served in the future the petition
is said to be premature."
Usually, if the prisoner fits into one of the four categories the federal
court will apply McNally v. Hill2' and summarily dismiss his petition.
Some writers have argued that the custody requirement has been weak-
ened by the Supreme Court's reversal of the fourth circuit by holding in
Jones v. Cunningham29 that a prisoner on parole was sufficiently in
custody to justify granting habeas corpus. Since its reversal, the fourth
circuit has not followed McNally but it appears to be a voice crying in
the wilderness since McNally is still followed in most circuits. s
B. Violation of Constitutional Rights
"Constitutional rights" should be thought of in those exact terms.
The prisoner must allege some deprivation of his rights arising under the
federal constitution.3' This is necessary for the federal court to have
jurisdiction to hear the petition. Without getting into the difficulties of
defining "arising under"' 2 the constitution, certain basic principles may
be set forth.
If the prisoner asserts a direct deprivation, for example, denial of
right to counsel under the sixth amendment, there is no problem. A more
difficult area is the fourteenth amendment due process clause since this
requires "state action." For example, the use of perjured testimony in a
state trial will not be sufficient unless the prosecution "knowingly used"
perjured testimony.33 The state action requirement is satisfied by the
action of the state prosecutor in knowingly using the perjured testimony.
Several common misconceptions should be clarified in relation to
constitutional claims. When a prisoner has been transferred from the
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 371 U.S. 236 (1963) ; See Note, The Custody Requirement for Habeas Corpus Re-
lief in the Federal Courts, 51 CAL. L. REV. 228 (1963).
30. A caveat is issued to the reader. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review
this question as of the time this article goes to the printer. Peyton v. Rowe, 383 F.2d 790
(4th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3286 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1968) (No. 802) See gener-
ally Comment, Viability of McNally v. Hill in the Modern Context, 65 MicH. L. REV. 172
(1966).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) are set out in note 19 supra.
32. The question must be one "arising under" the constitution to give the federal court
jurisdiction. The term "arising under" has not been satisfactorily defined at the present time.
See generally Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That A Case Arise "Directly"
Under Federal Law. 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967).
33. Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266 (1948); Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942);
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); King v. Wainwright, 368 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1966).
For a critical analysis of the Florida position See Note, Perjured testimony: Flordia's Sub-
stantive Window, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 358 (1960).
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custody of one to another he may not raise the issue of whether either of
the custodians waived jurisdiction over him . 4 When a voluntary plea of
guilty is entered the prisoner waives all objections such as a coerced con-
fession. 5 Further, the constitutional right must be one that existed at the
time the act complained of occurred or else be a constitutional right to
which the Supreme Court has given retroactive application."6
C. Exhaustion of State Remedies
"Exhaustion of state remedies" should be thought of in terms of
complete exhaustion. The prisoner must show that he has litigated his
claim of a deprivation of a constitutional right through every possible
state court or his petition will be dismissed as premature. When both the
federal and state doors are open, the prisoner must try the state door
first. 7
The principle is generally justified in terms of "comity" and is not a
jurisdictional requirement for the federal courts. As a matter of practical
efficiency, state courts are better able to deal with issues concerning state
procedures and practices. It eases the burden on federal courts since the
state appellate system may reverse the trial court or the prisoner will be
satisfied that his constitutional claim is not meritorious. Finally, both the
development of state law in accordance with federal standards and the
release by state courts of their own prisoners eases the tension between
state and federal judicial systems.88
34. Opheim v. Willingham, 364 F.2d 989,(10th Cir. 1966); Finley v. United States, 266
F.2d 29, (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 870, (1959) ; United States v. Williams, 203
F. Supp. 123 (S.D. Tex. 1962) aff'd 311 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1962).
35. Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966). This area is one in which the state
court judges have a "golden opportunity to protect their judgments from habeas corpus at-
tack. Federal Criminal Procedure Rule II provides in pertinent part that the federal courts
shall not accept a guilty plea "without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the charge." Extensive questioning is not required under the rules as seen
by Smith v. United States, 378 F.2d 296, 299 (5th Cir. 1967) in which the following
was held sufficient: "The Court: Then are you making this, are you entering this plea and
are you saying again today that you are guilty voluntarily and of your own free will?"
If the state trial judge questions the defendant before accepting a guilty plea, their ver-
dict will be immune to attack by federal habeas corpus. See Scarlett, Habeas Corpus, 18
MERCER L. REV. 354, 363 (1967). See also Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus
on State Trial Procedures 52 VA. L. REV. 286 (1966).
36. The recent trend in the Supreme Court decisions is away from retroactive applica-
tion. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) the Court held Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) applicable only to trials after the decision. In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
87 S.Ct. 1967 (1967) the Court refused retroactive application to the right to counsel in
police line-ups. See also Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (comment by prosecutor on
failure of a defendant to testify not retroactive) ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)
(Mapp, decision not retroactive). See generally Meador, Habeas Corpus and the "Retro-
activity" Illusion, 50 VA. L. REv. 1115 (1964) ; Note, Evidence-Confession Safeguards of
Escobedo and Miranda Are Not Retroactive, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 117 (1966).
37. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of An Abortive State Proceeding, 74 H~Av.
L. REV. 1315, 1364 (1961).
38. See Comment, Habeas Corpus - Effect of Supreme Court Change in Law on Ex-
haustion of State Remedies Requisite to Federal Habeas Corpus, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1303
(1965).
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The prisoner, of course, need not journey through the state courts if
his journey would be futile. The purpose of the principle is to exhaust
state remedies and not to exhaust state prisoners. 9 If the scope of the
state remedy is so narrow as to be inadequate and the possibility of state
relief so uncertain as to make the state remedy futile, or if the remedy is
foreclosed by state law, the prisoner need not exhaust his state remedies.4
D. Evidentiary Hearings
"Evidentiary hearing" should be thought of in terms of a possible
hearing. Many states have adopted pott-conviction proceedings with ade-
quate fact finding procedures that should eliminate the need for a hearing
in the federal courts4' or the only issue raised by the petition may be a
question of law which can be decided without a hearing.
If the petition raises a federal question or alleges facts, which if true,
would entitle the prisoner to release, a prima facie case is made. The
federal judge will then issue an order for the state custodian to show
cause why the writ should not be granted. The state is then required to
file a response which the judge considers in conjunction with the petition.
He must then decide, on the basis of the pleadings and records submitted,
whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. 2 Although many states have
adequate fact finding procedures and follow them, some federal judges
still insist on holding evidentiary hearings.43
39. United States v. La Vallee, 306 F.2d 199, 203 (2nd Cir. 1962).
40. Whippler v. Balkcom, 342 F.2d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1965). The court noted that the
Georgia remedies were indeed narrow:
Habeas corpus in Georgia is a door that not every constitutionally deprived prisoner
can open. The magic words are "deprivation of counsel." The applicant who can-
not say them may not pass.
41. Florida has adopted Crminal Procedure Rule One which is patterned after 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, the federal fact finding procedure. Tolar v. State, 196 So.2d 1 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
Other states have used different methods. See Note, Federal Habeas Corpus: Its Uncertain
Effects on Illinois Law, 59 N.W. U.L. REV. 696 (1964): Note, A Comparative Analysis of
the Ohio Postconviction Determination of Constitutional Rights Act. 17 W. REs. L. REV.
1367 (1966); Note, Habeas Corpus and the 1966 Post Conviction Hearing Act: Major Penn-
sylvania Remedies in Criminal Cases, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 188 (1966); Note, Federalism and Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus-What Impact on Georgia Criminal Law and Procedure?, 16 MERcER
L. REV. 281 (1964); Note, Constitutional Law-Habeas Corpus-New Post-Conviction Hear-
ing Act, 44 N.C.L. REV. 153 (1965) ; Federal Habeas Corpus Confronts the Colorado Courts:
Catalyst or Cataclysm?, 39 U. CoLo. L. REV. 83 (1966); Note, State Post-Conviction Reme-
dies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 154 (1965).
42. See Note, Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 78, 104 (1964).
43. The attitude of some federal judges is probably explained by language like that
found in Wright, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding
Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 897 (1966):
Federal district courts, in the exercise of their habeas corpus jurisdiction, have
been called upon to perform significant institutional functions. They have virtually
become the Supreme Court's delegates or masters, providing full and complete
records to make Supreme Court review more meaningful. (emphasis added).
See generally Post Conviction Applications Viewed by a Federal Judge, 39 F.R.D. 281 (1965);
Note, Symposium on Post-Conviction Remedies: Foreward and Afterward 27 Omo S.L.J.
237 (1966).
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E. The Right to Counsel
Once inside the federal "door" the prisoner, if indigent, may seek the
payment of costs and the appointment of counsel. It is well settled that
the prisoner is entitled to payment of fees and a transcript 4 but it is
equally well settled that the appointment of counsel is discretionary with
the court.45 Some writers had predicted that the Supreme Court would
extend the right to appointment of counsel to habeas corpus proceedings
during its recent term;46 but the court, instead, reaffirmed its position that
the right to counsel is limited to first appeal from conviction.47
The absence of an absolute right to appointed counsel is not as
severe a handicap as it may seem. The petitions for habeas corpus may
be filed on standardized forms in which the prisoners merely fill in the
appropriate blank spaces.48 From this standard petition the federal judge
is able to determine if there is any merit to the prisoner's claim or if he
has exhausted his state remedies. He then may exercise his discretion and
appoint counsel.
IV. TH-E CAUSES OF TENSION BETWEEN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
Armed with an understanding of the history and basic principles
underlying federal habeas corpus, we must next explore the causes of the
tension between federal and state judicial systems and see if the recent
amendments to the Federal Habeas Corpus Act can alleviate these ten-
sions. The main causes of the tension are the disputed Federal Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867, the recent decisions expanding the scope of federal
habeas corpus and the flood of habeas corpus petitions that have deluged
the courts since these decisions.
44. Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963);
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 357 U.S. 12 (1956).
45. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) ; Fleming LaClair v. United States, 374
F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1967) ; Fleming v. United States, 367 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Tolar v.
State, 196 So.2d 1 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
46. See Note, Adequate Appellate Review For Indigents: A Judicial Blend of Adequate
Transcript and Effective Counsel 52 IowA L. REv. 902, (1967).
47. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 387 (1963). The Douglas court carefully limited
the right:
[Wihere the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are de-
cided without the benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been
drawn between rich and poor.
The Douglas holding was re-affirmed in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The
hope for right to appointed counsel in habeas corpus proceedings was apparently laid to rest
in Long v. District of Iowa, 385. U.S. 192 (1966). In a per curiam decision, the court reaf-
firmed its 1963 position in Lane v. Brown that there is a right to transcript in habeas corpus
appeals. The court indicated in footnote two of the opinion that it will continue to treat
right to transcript and right to counsel as separate issues.
48. Sample forms may be found in Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review, 33
F.R.D. 363 (1964). Some writers have taken the position that fellow inmates should prepare
the petitions. See Note, Habeas Corpus: Right of Prisoners to Assistance of "Jail House
Lawyers" 66 COL JM. L. Rav. 1542 (1966); Note, Prisoner Assistance on Federal Habeas
Corpus Petitions, 19 STAN. L. Rav. 887 (1967). These articles seem moot in view of Johnson
v. Avery, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967) which reversed the case noted.
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A. The Disputed Act of 1867
The original Federal Habeas Corpus Act of 1801 has been amended
several times.4 9 One of the amendments was the Federal Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867.0 The Supreme Court has taken the position that an examina-
tion of legal history shows that this act authorized the federal review of
state criminal convictions. The legal historians take the position that an
examination of legal history shows to the contrary"' and have accused the
Court of "magisterial historiography." This dispute is critical, for if the
legal historians are correct, the federal review of state criminal convic-
tions is an unwarranted "power grab" by the federal courts. One historian
has summed up the dispute in the following way:
Few students of the law object to the Court's reshaping of old
remedies to fit new and growing social problems so long as the
the court moves within the interstitial area governed by what
Karl Llewellyn called the law of "leeways." But the legal rules
fashioned to cover such growth should be cloaked in reason, not
garbed in a regal patchwork of history that, on close examina-
tion, proves as embarrassingly illusory as the Emperor's new
clothes.
5 2
B. The Recent Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court made federal habeas corpus available to state
prisoners in Brown v. Allen." Since that decision, the availability of
habeas corpus has been increased in two distinct ways.
The first way has been by gradually expanding the scope of due
process, thereby increasing the number of grounds upon which violation
of constitutional rights may be based. Since Gideon v. Wainwright,54 in
which the right to counsel was extended to state felony trials, the Supreme
Court has decided Escobedo v. Illinois,5 Douglas v. California,"" Gilbert
49. See note 18, supra.
50. The text of this act is set out in Mayers, The Supreme Court as Legal Historian,
33 U. CI. L. REV. 31 (1965).
51. The Supreme Court's position is severely criticized in Mayers, The Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHm. L. REV. 31 (1965); Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441 (1963); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MicH. L. REV.
451 (1966).
52. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 451, 472
(1966). This article by Professor Oaks has many quotes which typify the legal historians'
reaction to the position taken by the Supreme Court. Some sample quotations are:
Legal historians--even those cited in the opinion-hold a view that is at odds
with the historical analysis in the Fay case. (Id. at 459)
To support this assertion, the Court offered three authorities: an ambiguous dic-
tum in a famous 1670 contempt case in Common Pleas, an obscure and unsupported
statement in Bacon's Abridgement, and a bill introduced in the House of Commons
in 1593 but never passed. (Id. at 461).
53. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
54. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
55. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
56. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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v. California,57 United States v. Wade,58 and Miranda v. Arizona,"9 which
have vastly increased the scope of due process.60
The other way that the availability of federal habeas corpus has been
increased is by the removal of procedural impediments in seeking the writ.
This was accomplished by three decisions of the Supreme Court based on
the disputed Act of 1867 that have become famous as the "1963 Trilogy."'"
In Fay v. Noial2 the Court held that the exhaustion of remedies doc-
trine was a rule of comity and not binding on the federal courts. The court
expressly overruled Darr v. Burford6" and held that the prisoner need not
seek review by appeal or certiorari to the Supreme Court before filing a
habeas corpus petition. The Court then held that the prisoner need not
exhaust state remedies that are not available to the prisoner at the time
he files his petition.
In Sanders v. United States,64 the court removed the principle of res
judiciata as an important consideration in federal habeas corpus applica-
tions." Lastly, in Townsend v. Sain, the Court increased the situations
in which the federal courts must hold an evidentiary hearing in spite of
tensions between federal and state judicial systems and crowded federal
dockets.
6 7
C. The Flood of Petitions
In 1953 the Supreme Court considered 541 habeas corpus petitions
to be a "flood" of petitions." By 1963 the number of petitions had in-
creased to 1,692.69 In 1964, the year following the "trilogy" decisions
which increased the availability of habeas corpus, there was an eighty-five
57. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
58. 388 U.S. 218, (1967).
59. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
60. The situation has been improved by the Supreme Court not holding many of these
cases retroactive in Stovall v. Denno, 386 U.S. 293 (1967). Miranda was held to apply only
to trials after the decision in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). See also, Tehan
v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, (1965) and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1964). See note 36
supra.
61. See Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-Habeas Corpus-The 1963 Trilogy,
42 N.C.L. REV. 352 (1964) [hereinafter cited Trilogy]. See note 52 supra for a criticism of
these cases.
62. 372 U.S. 391 (1963); See Note, Federal Habeas Corpus-An Extended Remedy, 18
Sw. L.J. 475 (1964).
63. 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
64. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
65. Thus the Court has completely removed res judicata as an important considera-
tion in post-conviction collateral relief. This was done because "conventional no-
tions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and
infringement of constitutional rights is alleged." Trilogy, supra note 61, at 370.
66. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
67. Trilogy, supra note 61, at 373.
68. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536 (1953).
69. SEN. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Session. 1 (1966). [hereinafter cited SEN. REP.
1797]. This report is set forth in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3663 (1966).
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per cent increase in the number of petitions. 7 The expansion of the scope
of due process of law in the ensuing years resulted in 6,356 petitions be-
ing filed between July 1, 1965 and June 30, 1966. 7' Since more than
ninety-five percent of these petitions are totally without merit, the federal
courts spent that year considering over 6,000 frivolous petitions.72 This
heavy burden on the federal courts is further complicated by the fact that
it takes about two years to dispose of the non-frivolous petitions.78
The drafting of these petitions has become a game with prisoners. It
offers relief from the boredom of an incarceration and, perhaps most
alluring to the prisoner, a chance to get out of prison for a week or two at
the state's expense to appear at an evidentiary hearing. 74 The saddest part
of this game is that the prisoner who may have a valid constitutional
claim has little chance for the federal court to evaluate it in sifting
through the thousands of meritless petitions. As the Supreme Court noted
in Brown v. Allen,75 the federal courts' task is comparable to searching
for a needle in a haystack:
[T]his court has sanctioned progressive trivialization of the writ
until floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate
the docket of the lower courts and swell our own. Judged by our
own disposition of habeas corpus matters, they have, as a class,
become peculiarly undeserving. It must prejudice the occasional
meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.
He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up
with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.7
6
V. THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS ACT7 7
The purpose of Congress in amending the federal habeas corpus act
was to expedite the handling of habeas corpus petitions by the federal dis-
trict courts. 78 The courts had been burdened by their duty to consider
successive petitions filed by prisoners due to the Supreme Court's decision
in Sanders v. United States79 which removed the doctrine of res judicata
as an important consideration in habeas corpus proceedings and further
burdened by their duty to hold evidentiary hearings due to the Supreme
70. SEN. REP. 1797.
71. SEN. REP. No. 170, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967). This report is set forth in 4
U.S. CODE CONG., & AD. NEWS 569, 576 (May 20, 1967).
72. SEN. REP. 1797.
73. See Carter, The Use of Federal Habeas Corpus by State Prisoners, 23 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 23, 33 (1966).
74. See Comment, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions From State Prisoners,
52 VA. L. REv. 486, 490 (1966).
75. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
76. Id. at 536-537.
77. See Note, 45 TEx. L. REV. 592 (1967).
78. SEN. RP. 1797.
79. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
1967]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
Court's decision in Townsend v. Sain8 that made evidentiary hearings
mandatory when state post conviction remedies were inadequate.
Two new subsections were added to section 2244 of the act which
impose severe limitations on successive petitions filed by state prisoners.
The purpose of these new subsections is to add a qualified doctrine of res
judicata to the act.8 ' These new subsections are necessary because state
prisoners have been filing petitions with allegations identical to those
asserted in previous petitions or predicated on grounds obviously well
known to them when they filed the preceding petition.
8 2
New subsection 2244(b) provides that after a federal court holds a
hearing on a habeas corpus petition it need not entertain a subsequent
petition based on new grounds unless the court is satisfied that the pri-
soner did not deliberately withhold the new ground or otherwise abuse the
writ.83 One court has construed this amendment to mean that the prisoner
must include all grounds that he can ascertain with "reasonable diligence"
in his original habeas corpus petition.
84
New subsection 2244(c) provides that when the prisoner has sought
review of his conviction by direct appeal to the highest state court and
thereafter seeks review in the Supreme Court by appeal or writ of cer-
tiorari, the finding of the Supreme Court is conclusive to all issues of law
and fact actually adjudicated if the prisoner later files a habeas corpus
petition. The adjudication by the Supreme Court will be conclusive in the
habeas corpus proceedings except when the prisoner pleads and proves
the existence of a material and controlling fact that did not appear in the
record of the Supreme Court proceedings and which the prisoner could
not have made appear in that record by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.8"
80. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
81. SEN. REAP. 1797.
82. Id.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b):
When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or
after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the United States
or a justice or judge of the United States release from custody or other remedy
on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ
of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of
the United States or a justice or judge of the United States unless the application
alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hear-
ing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is
satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld
the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.
84. Hill v. Nelson, 272 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
85. 28 U.S.C. §2244(c):
In a habeas corpus proceeding brought in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court, a prior judgment by the Supreme Court of the
United States on an appeal or review by a writ of certiorari at the instance of the
prisoner of the decision of such State court, shall be conclusive as to all issues of
fact or law with respect to an asserted denial of a Federal right which constitutes
ground for discharge in a habeas corpus proceeding, actually adjudicated by the
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The result of new subsection 2244(c) is that after a state prisoner
obtains initial review of his constitutional claim in the highest state court
he must decide whether to seek further review by appeal or certiorari in
the Supreme Court or file a habeas corpus petition in a federal district
court. If the facts have been adequately developed in the state courts, the
best method of review for the prisoner to use is by review in the Supreme
Court. If the facts have not been adequately developed in the state courts
his best method of review is by a habeas corpus proceeding in which the
facts may be adequately developed."6
New subsections 2244(b) and 2244(c) provide state prisoners with
an opportunity to have their constitutional claims fully heard by the fed-
eral courts. However, they may no longer have opportunity after oppor-
tunity ad infinitum as they have enjoyed in the past. The essence of these
new subsections is that the prisoners may now only file one petition for
habeas corpus. This change, limiting the filing of successive petitions,
should be a great assistance to the federal courts in shouldering their bur-
den of sifting through thousands of frivolous petitions in search of the few
meritorious ones with a valid constitutional claim.
Section 2254 was amended to provide that state court records are
presumptively correct in federal habeas corpus proceedings. This pre-
sumption of correctness will arise unless it is established that the state
proceedings were inadequate or upon a review of the state court record
the federal court concludes that it does not support.the factual deter-
mination of the state court.8 7
Supreme Court therein, unless the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus shall
plead and the court shall find the existence of a material and controlling fact which
did not appear in the record of the proceeding in the Supreme Court and the
court shall further find that the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus could not
have caused such fact to appear in such record by .the exercise of reasonable
diligence.
86. See Note, 45 Tax. L. REv. 592, 595 (1967).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d):
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,
a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State
court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ
and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be
presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise
appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State
court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State
court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over
the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in depriva-
tion of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him
in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing
in the State court proceeding; or
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If the federal court decides to hold an evidentiary hearing and the
presumption of correctness has not arisen, the prisoner has the burden of
proving by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the
state court was erroneous. 88 One court has held that the unrebutted
testimony by a state prisoner in a federal court evidentiary hearing that
his confession was obtained by violence does not meet his statutory bur-
den of proof when the state court has made a prior determination that the
confession was not obtained by violence. 89
The purpose of amending section 2254 was to encourage the states
to adopt adequate post conviction remedies." If the prisoner has had an
adequate hearing on his constitutional claim in a state court there is no
necessity for the federal courts to hold additional hearings. This amend-
ment, limiting the situations in which a federal court should hold eviden-
tiary hearings, will be a great assistance to the federal courts in relieving
their overcrowded dockets.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Allen9 created a Pan-
dora's box out of the federal habeas corpus act. Its justification of the de-
cision on the basis of legal history has been rejected by legal historians, 2
and the state judiciary has never accepted the release of duly convicted
state prisoners by a single federal judge based on his opinion of facts de-
veloped in federal habeas corpus evidentiary hearings. The Supreme
Court's decisions in the greatly criticized "trilogy" decisions which in-
creased the availability of habeas corpus93 and its decisions continually
expanding the scope of due process of law,94 created an intolerable situa-
tion which led to the amending of the federal habeas corpus act.
95
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the
State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in
which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a de-
termination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determina-
tion, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a con-
sideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual
determination is not fairly supported by the record...
88. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d):
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or
more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7),
inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the res-
pondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole,
does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the
applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the
State court was erroneous. (emphasis added).
89. Justus v. State of New Mexico, 378 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1967).
90. SEN. REP. 1797.
91. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
92. See note 52 supra.
93. See note 61 supra.
94. See note 54 supra.
95. See note 4 supra.
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The recent amendments offer a workable solution to the problems
created between federal and state judicial systems by the federal review
of state convictions. If the legal systems will follow the guidelines enu-
merated in the amendments both systems will benefit. The federal courts
will be relieved of their burdens of successive petitions and evidentiary
hearings and the state courts will be able to control the administration of
their own criminal law. Most importantly, a state prisoner with a valid
constitutional claim will have an opportunity to have it heard in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding which is, in the final analysis, the real purpose
of the federal habeas corpus act.
